A large-scale security breach on an e-democracy system would undermine the entire political process, and could call into question the validity of the election (Mercurio, 2002: 28). It is crucial to the success of e-democracy that a balance is sought between privacy and security (Finnegan, Salaman, Thompson (ed), 1990: 48). Therefore, without highly sophisticated and reliable security systems protecting an online voting system, voters won’t have the necessary level of confidence in e-democracy (Mercurio, 2002: 27).
Unlike the paper-based voting system, the Internet lends itself to more attacks from hackers who can bypass security systems (Rubin, 2000). There is a concern Internet elections could be the target of groups attempting to disrupt elections (Dixon, 2001: 9). The difficulty is security breaches are usually detected after the breach (Finnegan et al (ed), 1990: 46).
There are a variety of security concerns that could manifest themselves over the Internet, which may be difficult to guard against (Mercurio, 2003: 31):
Allowing remote voting also allows itself to more abuse from those who are offline, but at the computer terminal. There is a possibility that public computers used for voting could become the targets for coercion, where the traditional voting area was rigidly monitored (Rubin, 2000).
Identifying the voter as the person who is actually voting is another difficulty with e-voting while keeping the ballot private (Dixon, 2001: 10). The technology would therefore have to authenticate the voter, then remove any of those authenticating details from the vote in order to keep the ballot secret (Dixon, 2001: 10). This is usually done by a person applying for a PIN first, and then having it sent through the mail (Dixon, 2001: 3). Once the PIN is entered, a randomising algorithm makes sure the authorisation code didn’t match up to the vote cast (Mercurio, 2003: 37)
Having an audit trail on the computer would also create concerns about identifying a citizen with their vote, by having the computer log the votes, along with a swipe card starting the computer up, but again, a randomising algorithm is used so a voter’s vote isn’t recorded (Mercurio, 2003: 37).
With e-voting at the polling booth, concerns of security and identification are combated with the use of bar coded swipe cards which identify the voter, and prevent a single voter voting several times (Mercurio, 2003: 35). Also, the closed nature of the server makes it virtually impossible for a computer system at a polling station to be tampered with (Dixon, 2001: 16). However, a machine could still be physically tampered with (Mercurio, 2003: 36).
Ben Fraser 19:10, 28 Oct 2004 (EST)
Dixon, N (2001) E-Voting: Elections via the Internet? [Online] Available at: http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Parlib/Publications_pdfs/books/rbr0101nd.pdf. [Accessed 11 August 2004]
Finnegan, R, Salaman, G, Thompson, K (ed) Information Technology: Social Issues Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton ISBN 0340416696
Mercurio, B (2003) ‘Overhauling Australian Democracy: The Benefits and Burdens of Internet Voting’ University of Tasmania Law Review, vol 21(2) pp23-65 [Online]. Available through the Informit database. [Accessed 7 August 2004]
Rubin, A (2000) Security Considerations for Remote Electronic Voting over the Internet [Online] Available: http://www.avirubin.com/e-voting.security.html [Accessed 11 August 2004]
For more information on these sources, see the Annotated Bibliography
Ben Fraser 13:06, 26 Oct 2004 (EST)
Ben Fraser 00:35, 29 Oct 2004 (EST)
